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CASE COMMENTS
SHEDDING (FALSE) LIGHT: HOW THE FLORIDA SUPREME
COURT’S REJECTION OF THE TORT FALSELY IMPLIES
PROTECTION FOR MEDIA DEFENDANTS
Jews for Jesus, Inc. v. Rapp, 997 So. 2d 1098 (Fla. 2008)
Kristen Rasmussen*
Edith and Marty Rapp, a Jewish Florida couple, were married until
Marty’s death in 2003.1 Bruce Rapp, Marty’s son and Edith’s stepson,
worked for Jews for Jesus.2 Prior to Marty’s death, Bruce included the
following account in a Jews for Jesus3 newsletter:
I had a chance to visit with my father . . . [who] has been ill
for sometime . . . [O]ne morning Edi[th] began to ask me
questions about Jesus. I explained how G-d [sic] gave us
Y’Shua (Jesus) as the final sacrifice for our
atonement . . . She began to cry, and when I asked her if
she would like to ask G-d for forgiveness for her sins and
receive Y’Shua she said yes! My stepmother repeated the
sinner’s prayer with me-praise G-d!4
Jews for Jesus published the newsletter on the Internet, where one of
Edith’s relatives saw it.5
Alleging that Jews for Jesus falsely, and without her permission,
stated she had joined the organization and become a believer in its
tenets, Edith Rapp sued the group for false light invasion of privacy,
defamation, intentional infliction of emotional distress, negligent
*

J.D./M.A.M.C. (Mass Communication) Candidate, University of Florida, May 2010.
B.S., News-Editorial Journalism, Texas Christian University, December 2000. For their
penetrating insights, my deepest gratitude to Bob Bernius, Esq.; Randy Hammer, President and
Publisher, Asheville Citizen-Times; Dennis Larry, Esq.; the Honorable Paul Rasmussen (who
also is the best dad in the world); Chuck Tobin, Esq.; and the editors, members and staff of the
Florida Law Review. Finally, a woman could not ask for better mentors in this fascinating field
of media law than Professor Lyrissa B. Lidsky and Barbara W. Wall, Esq. This Comment
expresses my own views and not necessarily those of the people who shared their expertise with
me.
1. Jews for Jesus, Inc. v. Rapp, 997 So. 2d 1098, 1100 (Fla. 2008).
2. Id.
3. Jews for Jesus is a nonprofit evangelical group dedicated to converting Jews to
Christianity. Jews for Jesus, About Us, http://www.jewsforjesus.org/about (last visited June 27,
2009); see also Jews for Jesus, What Christians Should Know About Jews for Jesus,
http://files.jewsforjesus.org/pdf/other/what-christians-should-know.pdf.
4. Rapp, 997 So. 2d at 1100.
5. Id. at 1101.
911
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training and supervision, and negligent infliction of emotional distress.6
On appeal, the Florida Fourth District Court of Appeal affirmed the
dismissal of the defamation claim, but, “because of uncertainty in this
area of the law,” certified to the Florida Supreme Court the question of
whether Florida recognizes the tort of false light.7 The Florida Supreme
Court held that Florida does not recognize a cause of action for false
light invasion of privacy but does recognize defamation by implication.8
The court further held that a communication can be defamatory if it
prejudices the plaintiff in the eyes of a substantial and respectable
minority of the community.9
Boston lawyers Samuel D. Warren and Louis D. Brandeis first
articulated the common law tort of invasion of privacy in 1890.10 Dean
William Prosser, a leading tort law scholar, conceptualized false light
invasion of privacy in 196011 when he argued that invasion of privacy
6. Id. Rapp brought these five claims in three complaints, all of which the trial court
dismissed. Id.
7. Id. at 1101–02.
8. Id. at 1108, 1114.
9. Id. at 1115. A companion case to Rapp, Anderson v. Gannett Co., Inc., 994 So. 2d
1048 (Fla. 2008) (Anderson II), actually garnered more attention from both the popular press
and the legal community, most likely because of the $18.28 million false light jury verdict
imposed against the media defendant for wholly truthful statements. See, e.g., Patricia Avidan,
Comment, Protecting the Media’s First Amendment Rights in Florida: Making False Light
Plaintiffs Play by Defamation Rules, 35 STETSON L. REV. 227, 227–28 (2005) (stating that the
Anderson verdict and its hefty award “caused alarm” among media companies and their
advocates); Stephen Nohlgren, Verdict Shows Truth No Shield, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Jan. 4,
2004, at 1B, available at 2004 WLNR 3736911 (stating “the verdict has flabbergasted attorneys
for newspapers” and quoting the reporter’s lawyer who described the verdict as “ludicrous”).
In Anderson, a Pensacola News Journal article—one in a four-day investigative series
published in 1998—focused on an influential road paver’s political influence but also recounted
a 1988 hunting accident in which the paver, Joe Anderson, Jr., shot and killed his wife. Gannett
Co., Inc. v. Anderson, 947 So. 2d 1, 2–3 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006) (Anderson I). Although Anderson
conceded that the facts in the article were true, he claimed that its failure to state that the
authorities ruled the shooting accidental until two sentences after the original mention of the
shooting created the false impression that he murdered his wife and escaped criminal
prosecution because of his political influence. Id. Nearly three years later, however, the Florida
First District Court of Appeal reversed the jury award, ruling that the trial court should have
dismissed the case because Anderson mischaracterized his lawsuit as a false light claim to evade
the two-year statute of limitations in defamation cases. Id. at 8–9. On the same day it released
the Rapp opinion, the Florida Supreme Court ruled in Anderson that because Florida does not
recognize false light, the statute of limitations issues raised on appeal were moot. Anderson II,
994 So. 2d at 1050 & n.2.
10. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193,
195 (1890) (arguing that the common law should protect an individual’s right to be left alone).
11. The Florida Supreme Court recognized invasion of privacy (without specific
recognition of false light) as a common law cause of action in 1944 in Cason v. Baskin, 20 So.
2d 243, 250–51 (Fla. 1944) (“[T]he great fundamental object and principle of the common law
was the protection of the individual in the enjoyment of all his inherent and essential rights and
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consists of four separate torts: intrusion upon the plaintiff’s seclusion or
solitude, or into his private affairs; public disclosure of embarrassing
private facts about the plaintiff; publicity which places the plaintiff in a
false light in the public eye; and appropriation, for the defendant’s
advantage, of the plaintiff’s name or likeness.12 In 1977, the
Restatement (Second) of Torts codified Dean Prosser’s description of
the four categories of invasion of privacy and defined false light as
follows:
One who gives publicity to a matter concerning another
that places the other before the public in a false light is
subject to liability to the other for invasion of privacy, if
(a) the false light in which the other was placed would be
highly offensive to a reasonable person, and
(b) the actor had knowledge of or acted in reckless
disregard as to the falsity of the publicized matter
and the false light in which the other would be
placed.13
The United States Supreme Court first addressed false light invasion
of privacy in 1967 in Time, Inc. v. Hill.14 Building on New York Times
Co. v. Sullivan,15 the seminal defamation case decided three years
earlier, the Hill Court held that a false light plaintiff must prove actual
malice against a media defendant.16 Seven years later, in Cantrell v.
Forest City Publishing Co.,17 the Court ruled that a newspaper and its
reporter placed the Cantrell family in a false light when the paper
knowingly or recklessly published inaccuracies and falsehoods about
the widow of a man who died when a bridge collapsed.18 The Court has
not addressed false light in over a quarter of a century, helping render
to afford him a legal remedy for their invasion . . . [but] ‘[t]he right of privacy does not prohibit
the publication of matter which is of legitimate public or general interest. At some point the
public interest in obtaining information becomes dominant over the individual’s desire for
privacy.’”) (citation omitted). Cason involved the invasion of privacy torts of misappropriation
and the publication of private information. Id. at 244–45. For an excellent discussion of the
origin and development of false light in both the United States and Florida, see generally
Avidan, supra note 9, at 231–44.
12. William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL. L. REV. 383, 389 (1960).
13. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652E (1977); see also Russell G. Donaldson,
Annotation, False Light Invasion of Privacy: Cognizability and Elements, 57 A.L.R. 4th 22
(1987) (listing the five elements of false light as relation to a private matter, falsity, publicity, a
high degree of offensiveness to a reasonable person, and actual malice).
14. 385 U.S. 374 (1967).
15. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
16. Hill, 385 U.S. at 387–88.
17. 419 U.S. 245 (1974).
18. Id. at 247–48, 253.
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the tort “the least-recognized and most controversial aspect of invasion
of privacy.”19
As the Florida Supreme Court notes in Rapp, it had never before
considered the issue of false light invasion of privacy other than in
dicta.20 Prior to the Rapp and Anderson opinions, the leading false light
appellate case in Florida was Heekin v. CBS Broadcasting, Inc.21 In
Heekin, the plaintiff alleged that a 60 Minutes segment on domestic
violence falsely portrayed him as a spousal abuser by juxtaposing an
interview with his ex-wife with stories and pictures of women who were
abused and killed by their domestic partners.22 Heekin conceded the
specific facts about him in the broadcast were true, and the trial court
granted CBS’ motion to dismiss, in part, because Heekin failed to state
a cause of action for false light invasion of privacy when he did not
allege that the information in the broadcast was false.23 The appellate
court reversed, however, holding that falsity of information is not an
element of false light.24 On remand, the trial court granted CBS’ motion
for judgment on the pleadings, finding that the broadcast did not convey
a false impression.25 The appellate court affirmed without an opinion.26
As with false light, the Florida Supreme Court had never considered
defamation by implication until Rapp; however, Florida appellate courts
had previously recognized the cause of action.27 In Boyles v. MidFlorida Television Corp.,28 the Florida Fifth District Court of Appeal
19. Cain v. Hearst Corp., 878 S.W.2d 577, 579 (Tex. 1994) (citations omitted). About
two-thirds of states recognize false light, while about one-third either never recognized it or
initially recognized it and then rejected the cause of action altogether. Avidan, supra note 9, at
236. The majority of states that have rejected the tort (now, including Florida) have done so
“because of the ‘overlap’ between false light and defamation.” Id.; see also J. Clark Kelso,
False Light Privacy: A Requiem, 32 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 783, 788, 835 (1992) (“Because the
overlap between defamation and false light is so pronounced even in theory, it is no surprise that
false light and defamation almost always go hand in hand, and the cases involving allegations of
both defamation and false light are the single largest class of false light cases. . . . It is time to
end the confusion and declare that false light [invasion of] privacy forms no part of the common
law.”); Diane Leenheer Zimmerman, False Light Invasion of Privacy: The Light That Failed, 64
N.Y.U. L. REV. 364, 369 (1989) (arguing that because of its duplication of defamation, false
light is “a conceptually empty tort,” and states with a commitment to freedom of speech will
ultimately feel compelled to refuse to recognize its existence).
20. Jews for Jesus, Inc. v. Rapp, 997 So. 2d 1098, 1103 (Fla. 2008).
21. 789 So. 2d 355 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001).
22. Id. at 357.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 359 (citing Cason v. Baskin, 20 So. 2d 243, 252 (Fla 1944)).
25. Amended Order at 1, 2, Heekin v. CBS Broad., Inc., No. 99-5478-CA (Fla. Cir. Ct.
12th Dist. July 28, 2003).
26. Heekin v. CBS Broad., Inc., 892 So. 2d 1027 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004) (unpublished table
opinion).
27. Jews for Jesus, Inc. v. Rapp, 997 So. 2d 1098, 1107 (Fla. 2008).
28. 431 So. 2d 627 (Fla. 5th DCA 1983).
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reversed the trial court’s dismissal of a libel per se claim based on a
news broadcast that implied that the plaintiff was a habitual tormentor
of retarded patients, that he had raped a patient in his care, and that he
was a suspect in the death of a mentally retarded child who lived in a
group home operated by the plaintiff’s mother.29 And in Brown v.
Tallahassee Democrat, Inc.,30 the Florida First District Court of Appeal
reversed the trial court’s dismissal of the plaintiff’s complaint alleging
the newspaper published a story about a murder trial, accompanied by a
photograph of the plaintiff identified as the murder defendant.31
Armed only with Florida intermediate appellate court opinions and
United States Supreme Court opinions dating back to the 1960s and 70s,
the Florida Supreme Court in the instant case was essentially writing on
a blank slate. In doing so, it initially recognized that although it had
previously acknowledged the four categories of invasion of privacy,
including false light, none of the cases specifically recognized the
right.32 In analyzing this issue of first impression, the court focused on
the public policy implications of recognizing the tort33 by comparing it
and then contrasting it with defamation.34
The court first acknowledged false light proponents’ argument that
false light, unlike defamation, allows recovery for literally true
statements that create a false impression,35 but disposed of this
argument by reinforcing the fact that Florida allows for recovery for
defamation by implication, in which literally true statements that create
a false impression of the plaintiff can be defamatory.36 The state’s jury
instructions, the court said, recognize that a statement is not defamatory
if its “gist” is true;37 conversely, according to the court, defamation law
will not protect defendants who have “‘the details right but the ‘gist’
wrong.’”38
The court next addressed the nature of the interests protected by
29. Id. at 630–31, 641.
30. 440 So. 2d 588 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983).
31. Id. at 589–90; see also Anderson I, 947 So. 2d 1, 11 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006) (rejecting
the assertion that only false light claims can be based on statements that are true).
32. Rapp, 997 So. 2d at 1103 (“[W]e have reviewed each of the[] cases [that acknowledge
the four general categories of invasion of privacy] and conclude that the Court was simply
repeating citations from academic treatises or law review articles about privacy torts in general
or discussing an alternative tort in particular.”).
33. Id.
34. Id. at 1105–06.
35. Id. at 1106.
36. Id. Although the court stated that “defamation by implication . . . has a longstanding
history in defamation law,” id., that tradition does not extend to Florida. See supra notes 27–31
and accompanying text. While three appellate courts in Florida have recognized the existence of
this cause of action, the Florida Supreme Court has not approved of any of these decisions.
37. Rapp, 997 So. 2d at 1107.
38. Id. at 1108 (quoting DAN B. DOBBS ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF
TORTS 117, § 116 (5th ed. Supp. 1988)).
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each tort, concluding that defamation protects the objective interest of
reputation while false light protects the subjective interest of emotional
injury.39 Because Florida courts have recognized defamation by
implication, and because the interests protected by the two torts are “too
subtle” in their distinctions, the court stated that little justification exists
for the recognition of false light.40
The court next acknowledged how First Amendment rights would be
negatively affected by the recognition of false light, noting the chilling
effect caused by the vagueness of the “highly offensive to a reasonable
person standard.”41 The court also enumerated a number of privileges
and safeguards associated with defamation but not false light.42 The
court noted that other states, including Tennessee, Utah, and West
Virginia, simply extend the defamation safeguards to false light causes
of action.43 The Florida Supreme Court, however, left this option open
to the Legislature.44 Ultimately, because the court concluded that “false
light is largely duplicative of existing torts, but without the attendant
protections of the First Amendment,” it declined to recognize the tort of
false light but did recognize the tort of defamation by implication.45
Finally, the court held that an allegedly defamatory statement must
be evaluated from the standpoint of a “‘substantial and respectable’
minority of the community,” thereby adopting comment (e) to § 559 of
the Restatement.46 The court declined to consider the merits of Rapp’s
39. Id. at 1109 (quoting Welling v. Weinfeld, 866 N.E.2d 1051, 1057 (Ohio 2007)); see
also Posting of Marc Randazza to Citizen Media Law Project, Rapp v. Jews for Jesus,
Rehnquist in Brennan’s Robes, http://www.citmedialaw.org/blog/2008/rapp-v-jews-jesusrehnquist-brennans-robes (Oct. 24, 2008) (stating that false light provides compensation for
“mere hurt feelings.”). Similarly, former Florida Supreme Court Justice Harry Lee Anstead
described the false light standard as a “thin-skinned” one. Oral Argument, Jews for Jesus, Inc. v.
Rapp, 997 So. 2d 1098 (Fla. 2008) (No. SC06-2491), available at
http://wfsu.org/gavel2gavel/archives/08-03.html.
40. Rapp, 997 So. 2d at 1109 (quoting Denver Publ’g Co. v. Bueno, 54 P.3d 893, 902
(Colo. 2002)). Also of concern to the court was the subjective nature of the false light standard.
Id. at 1110. “[U]tilizing a subjective standard that ‘fails to draw reasonably clear lines between
lawful and unlawful conduct’ may impermissibly restrict free speech under the First
Amendment.” Id. (quoting Cain v. Hearst Corp., 878 S.W.2d 577, 584 (Tex. 1994)).
41. Id. at 1110.
42. Id. at 1111–12. For example, these include the statutory requirement that a
prospective plaintiff give a media defendant notice five days before initiating a civil action, and
a statutory limit on damages when certain criteria are met. Id.
43. Id. at 1112.
44. Id. (“In fact, we note that this matter has already been studied by the Legislature, but
no action has yet been taken.”).
45. Id. at 1100.
46. Id. at 1115 (“[A]n unprivileged falsehood need not entail universal hatred to constitute
a cause of action. No falsehood is thought about or even known by all the world. No conduct is
hated by all.”). Id. Justice Wells dissented on this point, stating that, “[t]he standard of a
‘substantial and respectable minority’ is plainly too vague to be a fairly applied standard. There
is no way to know how many it takes to constitute a ‘substantial’ number or what constitutes a
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defamation claim and remanded it to the Florida Fourth District Court
of Appeal for consideration.47
Members of the media and their advocates rejoiced at the opinion,48
and rightfully so. The Florida Supreme Court reinforced the First
Amendment limits on defamation law by eliminating a cause of action
that duplicates defamation but is devoid of the constitutional and
statutory safeguards essential to freedom of expression. The rejection of
the tort also protects media defendants from plaintiffs who use false
light as an end run around defamation law and its strict requirements.49
Significantly, the court also places First Amendment interests above
those “relatively few unique situations”50 in which statements are
offensive but not necessarily defamatory.51 Thus, news organizations
are free to publish statements without a fear of litigation brought by
plaintiffs with hurt feelings. In striking the balance between the right of
privacy and First Amendment interests, the court weighs in favor of the
latter.
Ironically, though, by recognizing defamation by implication, the
court eroded many of the protections it had just bestowed. Given, for
example, the strong overlap between defamation by implication and
false light,52 the elimination of the latter is unlikely to serve as a
‘respectable minority.’ What does ‘respectable’ mean in this context?” Id. at 1116. (Wells, J.,
dissenting).
47. Id. at 1114.
48. See, e.g., Lucy Morgan, Florida Court Rejects “False Light” Lawsuit, ST.
PETERSBURG TIMES, Oct. 24, 2008, at 7B (“‘This is an incredible victory for anybody who
reports or comments on issues of public concern. . . . The sort of mud bog false light threw us
into for the past [ten] years has been damaging to journalism and to public knowledge and
understanding.’” (quoting St. Petersburg Times lawyer Alison Steele) “‘This is a great day, not
only for the News Journal and Gannett, but also for newspapers and the media who will all
benefit from this decision . . . It’s been a long experience.’” (quoting Pensacola News Journal
president and publisher Kevin Doyle)).
49. For further discussion of a plaintiff’s use of false light as a means to evade
defamation’s shorter statute of limitations, see supra note 9 (discussing Joe Anderson, Jr.’s
claim against the Pensacola News Journal and parent company Gannett).
50. Rapp, 997 So. 2d at 1114.
51. The court gives as an example the portrayal of the plaintiff as suffering from a
terminal illness, a statement that is “not necessarily defamatory, but [is] potentially highly
offensive.” Id. at 1113 (quoting Denver Publ’g Co. v. Bueno, 54 P.3d 893, 902–03 (Colo.
2002)). Interestingly, another strong example seems to be the portrayal of a Jewish plaintiff who
converted to Christianity. Some scholars have argued for a limited doctrine of false light that
targets such statements. See, e.g., Gary T. Schwartz, Explaining and Justifying a Limited Tort of
False Light Invasion of Privacy, 41 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 885, 887, 919 (1991) (advocating for
“a limited doctrine of false light” for “nondisparaging false statements” that are “highly
offensive.”).
52. The Rapp court itself stated that the different standards—highly offensive to a
reasonable person for false light versus injury to reputation in the community for defamation—
is the main distinction between the elements of the two torts and is “a distinction without a
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deterrent to plaintiffs who feel they have been either injured or
offended.53 Simply put, the effect is not to protect the news media from
litigation that would chill speech, but merely to collapse one set of
cases, false light, into another, defamation by implication.54
More significant, though, is the fact that wholly true statements can
still give rise to claims against the media. That is, journalists in Florida
are still chilled by a requirement that they always consider not only
whether their statements are capable of a defamatory meaning, but a
defamatory implication as well. Such a determination is difficult for the
reporter and difficult for the court to resolve at the summary judgment
stage and could result in costly defamation litigation, 55 which creates a
strong chilling effect. 56
Along those same lines, the court’s adoption of comment (e) to
§ 559 of the Restatement as the “community” standard for analyzing a
difference in practice because conduct that defames will often be highly offensive to a
reasonable person, just as conduct that is highly offensive will often result in injury to one’s
reputation.” Rapp, 997 So. 2d at 1109.
53. See Barbara Busharis, What’s Truth Got To Do With It?—The Florida Supreme Court
Recognizes Defamation by Implication, TRIAL ADVOC. Q., Winter 2009, at 4, 5 (stating that few,
if any, plaintiffs will be seriously disadvantaged by foreclosing false light as a separate cause of
action).
54. Concededly, defamation by implication has always been an available cause of action
in Florida, but the state has not seen the spate of defamation by implication cases that it has of
false light cases, especially since the $18 million Anderson verdict in 2003. Contrast the
existence of three appellate defamation by implication cases with the comments of James
McGuire, a partner in the media law firm of Thomas, LoCicero & Bralow in Tampa, who said
that the majority of his firm’s cases in the last three years have been false light cases. James
McGuire, Partner, Thomas, LoCicero & Bralow, Panel Discussion on False Light at the Annual
Hot Topics in Media Law Workshop in Tampa, Fla. (Apr. 4, 2008) (notes on file with author)
[hereinafter Panel Discussion on False Light]; see also supra note 36 (discussing Florida’s scant
treatment of defamation by implication). It seems feasible then that plaintiffs who formerly
would have brought false light claims will now try to bring defamation by implication claims
instead.
55. The juxtaposition of two truthful sentences in one article in a multi-day series
spawned an eight-year legal battle between Gannett and road paver Anderson. See supra note 9.
56. Robyn Tomlin, Executive Editor of the Wilmington (N.C.) Star-News and former
Executive Editor of the Ocala Star-Banner, said the Anderson verdict had a strong negative
impact on media outlets in Florida. Robyn Tomlin, Executive Editor, Wilmington (N.C.) StarNews, Panel Discussion on False Light, supra note 54 (notes on file with author). Although
editors at Ms. Tomlin’s former paper never declined to run a particular story in the wake of the
verdict, she said they were overly conscientious about the order in which statements appeared in
stories. Id. Further, Ms. Tomlin said editors began to strongly evaluate, when deciding to pursue
a particular story or not, whether the subject or subjects of the story were overly rich or
litigious. Id. Though false light is no longer recognized in Florida, this same danger of costly
litigation and large jury verdicts is now present in claims for defamation by implication. It is
important to note, however, that although defamation by implication can still impose liability
for truthful speech that creates a false implication, it is clearly preferable to false light because
of the constitutional and statutory protections that mitigate the impact of the tort.
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defamation claim is also likely to cause further litigation. The court
does little to define what a “substantial and respectable minority of the
community”57 is, except to quote from a 1914 case saying that a
reputational injury in a plaintiff’s “personal, social, official or business
relations” is sufficient to support a defamation claim.58 Beyond these
vagueness concerns, though, is the reality that a “community” standard
will allow more claims to reach the trial stage.
The Rapp opinion, therefore, is not the sweeping victory for First
Amendment proponents and news organizations that it may initially
appear to be. To be sure, its rejection of false light in favor of
constitutional protections for speech is forceful and likely to influence
other courts to rule likewise. However, its recognition of defamation by
implication has the potential to accomplish precisely what the court
feared would occur with the false light standard: a strong chilling effect
on speech brought about by more costly defamation litigation.

57. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
58. Jews for Jesus, Inc. v. Rapp, 997 So. 2d 1098, 1115 (Fla. 2008) (quoting Land v.
Tampa Times Publ’g Co., 67 So. 130, 130 (Fla. 1914)). As an example, the court lists a doctor
who had been represented as advertising his or her services. Id. What the court does not address,
though (and what is most germane to this discussion), is whether a Jewish woman’s reputation
would be injured in the eyes of a “substantial and respectable minority of the community” by a
report that she had converted to Christianity.
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